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It is conventionally believed that neutral legal principles required antislavery judges to
uphold proslavery legislation in spite of their moral convictions against slavery. Under this
view, an antislavery judge who ruled on proslavery legislation was forced to choose, not between
liberty and slavery, but rather between liberty and fidelity to his conception of the judicial role in
a system of limited government. 1 Focusing on the proslavery Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, this

1

The conventional view is comprehensively presented in: Robert Cover, Justice Accused:

Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975). This view,
however, has not gone completely unchallenged. Several book reviews have suggested that
Cover may have overstated the antislavery character of antebellum judges or that the judges’
claims that they lacked legal discretion to rule against proslavery laws may have been selfserving justifications rather than the actual motivation behind their decisions. See Redmond J.
Barnett, “Review: Professionalism and the Chains of Slavery,” Mich. L. Rev. 77 (1979), 673-74;
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paper challenges the conventional view by arguing that the constitutionality of the fugitive act
was ambiguous---meaning that neutral legal principles supported a ruling against the fugitive act
as well as a ruling in favor of it---and prominent antislavery judges were influenced to uphold the
act by a belief that doing so was necessary in order to preserve the Union.
Three lines of argument support this thesis. First, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the
primary proslavery law cited by the conventional view and perhaps the most important
proslavery law brought before northern judges, was a crucial element of a fragile sectional
compromise that was widely perceived to be an essential condition of the Union. The judges
were thus no doubt aware that a ruling against the act would have serious political consequences.
Second, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was not clearly constitutional under either constitutional
theory or existing legal precedent. Any judge predisposed to render an antislavery ruling would
therefore have had ample opportunity to do so without violating formal legal principles. Third,

Don E. Fehrenbacher, “Review: Proslavery Law and Antislavery Judges,” Reviews in American
History, 3 (1975), 454-55; Mark Tushnet, “Review,” Journal of American Legal History, 20
(1975), 169. However, no one has yet offered a developed argument against Cover’s thesis,
which seems to have been accepted by most academics in both law and history. See, e.g., Paul
Finkelman, “Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the Value of ‘Justice Delayed’”
Iowa L. Rev. 78 (1992), 89; Earl M. Maltz, “Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the
Constitution,” The American Journal of Legal History 36 (1992), 495; Martha Strassberg,
“Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics,” Iowa L. Rev. 80
(1995), 901; Stuart Streichler, Justice Curtis in the Civil War Era (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2005), 41.
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the most prominent antislavery judges to rule on the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a matter of
first impression, Justice John Mclean and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, likely supported it as a necessary expedient to save the Union despite
their personal feelings against slavery in the abstract. In fact, these judges strained to rule
against alleged fugitive slaves on factual and procedural grounds in addition to their proslavery
constitutional rulings. Political forces external to judging, legal considerations, and the judges’
personal beliefs thus all support the claim that policy considerations influenced the judges’
proslavery decisions.
The conventional view is correct in that antislavery jurists justified their decisions by
appealing to judicial positivism--they claimed that the positive law, which trumped morality and
natural law, dictated a proslavery result. Judicial positivism, however, probably served as an expost justification rather than as an ex-ante motivation for their decisions. The judges had
obvious incentives to disclaim any opportunity to render an antislavery opinion, and, even if the
judges actually believed that they were constrained by positive law, they in fact had the
discretion to rule against the Fugitive Slave Act using formal legal principles. Their decisions to
uphold the act were thus at least somewhat shaped by policy considerations, though perhaps
unconsciously. It therefore seems that, even for judges who viewed slavery as morally
reprehensible, the political explosiveness of the slavery issue at mid century fostered proslavery
decisions.
Understanding the judges’ inclinations regarding the Fugitive Slave Act should change
the way we view the American antislavery judge. Perhaps reading present day morals into the
past, the conventional view assumes that antislavery judges were unwaveringly opposed to
slavery and proslavery legislation in moral terms. When viewed in light of the judges’ other
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slavery decisions, however, a different picture emerges. The same judges who upheld the
proslavery fugitive act also ruled in favor of freeing slaves voluntarily brought into the North and
banning slavery from the territories. Like the moderate political actors of the antebellum era,
antislavery judges were likely only inclined to support those antislavery positions that they felt
would not endanger the Union.
I.

Political Context

In order to appreciate why antislavery judges supported the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as a
matter of policy, it is necessary to first understand the political context in which they operated.
By the late 1840s the economic issues that had played a prominent role in earlier national party
struggles had given way to new and more pressing sectional concerns.2 Following the
acquisition of new territory during the Mexican War, David Wilmot, in his famous Wilmot
Proviso, moved that slavery be banned from all newly acquired lands. This proviso, which
gained the support of most northerners in Congress, was seen as “an insult to the South” and an
official condemnation of southern institutions as morally undeserving.3 Southerners also worried
that if the national government could use moral condemnation of slavery and disapproval of the

2

See William J. Cooper, The South and the Politics of Slavery: 1828-1856, (Baton Rouge:

Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 229-30.
3

1 William W. Freehling, Road to Disunion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 461

(quoting Alexander Stevens).
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anti-republican “slavepower” to contain slaveholders in the South, they could use the same
justifications to attack slavery itself once expansion had increased northern political power.4
In addition to the territorial controversy, Southerners demanded a new fugitive slave law,
as it was widely believed that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was a dead letter in the North. The
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 authorized state magistrates and federal judges to issue certificates
that authorized the removal of alleged fugitive slaves back to the South.5 In the 1842 case of
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, however, Justice Joseph Story, in what has been treated as the opinion of
the Court, held that the federal government was granted exclusive power under the Fugitive
Slave Clause and cast serious doubt on whether Congress could force state officers to enforce the
act.6 Some northern states exploited Justice Story’s dicta by passing personal liberty laws, which
prohibited state officers from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act and withdrew all other state
assistance, such as the use of state jails, in the rendition of fugitive slaves.7 Because there were
relatively few U.S. marshals and federal judges available to enforce the law, the withdrawal of
state enforcement left it virtually nullified.
When the national political parties failed to resolve these sectional issues, southern
leaders called for action. In Congress, Senator John C. Calhoun wrote an Address to the People

4

Ibid., 461-62. The “slavepower” was seen as anti-republican because slaveholding states had

more political power than their white population would dictate.
5

Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 2 Stat. 302-05 (1793).

6

41 U.S. 539 (1842), 615-22.

7

See Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 109,

127.
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of the Southern States, which listed northern transgressions against southern rights and called on
the South to unite. Although the address was unable to gain the support of southern Whigs,8
many southern states adopted ominous resolutions threatening action if the Wilmot Proviso
passed Congress. In addition, a southern convention was called in Nashville “to devise and
adopt some mode of resistance to [northern]… aggressions.”9 Before Congress convened in
1850, southern editorials, mass meetings, and congressmen all warned of the possibility of
disunion if the sectional issues were not resolved.10 According to historian David M. Potter,
“most public men were deeply impressed by the gravity of the crisis.”11
The Compromise of 1850, first proposed by Senator Henry Clay, emerged as a sweeping
compromise that was designed to provide a final resolution to the sectional controversy.12 The
territorial concerns were addressed by immediately admitting California as a state on her own
terms, which meant without slavery,13 and establishing territorial governments in the rest of the

8

Whigs were suspicious of Calhoun’s motives and thought that newly elected Whig President

Zachary Taylor could resolve the crisis. David M. Potter, Impending Crisis (New York: Harper
& Row, 1976), 85-86.
9

Morris, Free Men All, 130 (citing The Growth of Southern Nationalism).

10

Potter, Impending Crisis, 96.

11

Ibid.

12

Ibid., 97.

13

California was admitted under an antislavery constitution that had already been presented to

Congress without going through a territorial phase.
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Mexican Cession without the Wilmot Proviso.14 The South thus won a symbolic victory by
avoiding the humiliation of the Wilmot Proviso, but, since southern California was the only area
hospitable to slavery, this proposal was practically a concession to the North.15 Next, most of the
disputed territory in the slave state of Texas was given to the New Mexico Territory, and the
slave trade in the District of Columbia was abolished, both of which also obviously favored the
North.
The major concession demanded by the South was a new and more effective fugitive
slave law. Northern moderates understood that a southern victory on the fugitive slave issue was
needed to induce southern moderates to accept the Compromise and undermine the position of
southern disunionists.16 The South was thus essentially permitted to draft a bill of its own
choosing, and the Fugitive Slave Act 1850 emerged as a strongly pro-southern bill designed to
aid southerners in the reclamation of fugitives despite the inaction of northern states.17
Although the Compromise of 1850 forestalled the threat of southern secession,
enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act was widely perceived to be a necessary condition of
Union. President Millard Fillmore pledged “to bring the whole force of the government” to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act in the North, which he saw as a means to undermine southern

14

The status of slavery was otherwise left ambiguous. It was unclear whether, as northern

Democrats claimed, voters in the territories could ban slavery, or, as southerners argued, slavery
was mandatory until the territory was admitted as a state.
15

Potter, Impending Crisis, 99-100.

16

Freehling, Road to Disunion, 486.

17

The content of the Fugitive Slave Act will be discussed in detail below in Section II (i).
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support for disunion and set a precedent of using national force to deter secessionists.18 In the
South, both parties endorsed the Georgia Platform, which pledged that the South “would abide
by [the Compromise of 1850] as a permanent adjustment of this sectional controversy” and
would resist, even to the point of secession, any attempt to alter it. Its final resolution ominously
warned that “upon a faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law by the proper authorities
depends the preservation of our much beloved Union.”19
II.

The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850

The conventional account of the antislavery judge largely disregards the political importance
of the Fugitive Slave Act and assumes that it was clearly constitutional under existing
precedent.20 Under this view, antislavery legal arguments relied on natural law--legal principles
based on morality--and conflicted with formal legal principles such as judicial precedent and

18

Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1999), 598 (quoting Fillmore).
19

Ibid., 614. Proving that such views were shared by the judiciary, Supreme Court Justice

Samuel Nelson warned: “My deep conviction and belief are, that [the Union] depends, at this
moment, upon the confidence inspired by the late proceedings in congress, and by the indications
of public sentiment in the free states that this constitutional obligation [to return fugitive slaves]
will be hereafter executed in the faith and spirit with which it was entered into . . . .” In re
Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1851), 1012.
20

Cover, Justice Accused, 207 (stating that the constitutionality of the fugitive slave acts was

“well-established by the 1850’s”).
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statutory and constitutional interpretation.21 These formal legal principles were critical to the
nineteenth century conception of the judicial role, as the unelected judiciary had long justified
judicial review of the political branches by arguing that formal legal principles constrained
judicial discretion.22 Under this conventional view, because antislavery arguments violated
formal legal principles, antislavery judges were forced to choose between their moral convictions
against slavery and fidelity to their conception of the judicial role in a system of limited
government.23
At least with respect to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, however, judges who ruled as a
matter of first impression were not faced with such a decision.24 Although antislavery judges
claimed that formal legal considerations forced them to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,
this simply was not true. Most modern scholars agree that strong arguments existed both for and
against the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.25 This paper does not attempt to

21

Ibid. 197-98, 131-148.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid. Cover further explains that “the legal actor did not choose between liberty and slavery.

He had to choose between liberty and ordered federalism; between liberty and consistent limits
on the judicial function; between liberty and fidelity to public trust; between liberty and
adherence to the public corporate undertakings of nationhood; or, as some of the judges would
have it, between liberty and the viability of the social compact.” Ibid., 198.
24

After circuit courts upheld the law, however, federal district judges were bound to follow suit.

25

See Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave Catchers (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

Press, 1970); Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States
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render a conclusive determination of the act’s validity; rather, it only seeks to establish that the
act’s constitutionality was open to legitimate debate within a traditional legal framework.
i. Content of the Fugitive Slave Act
The Fugitive Slave Act’s questionable constitutionality resulted from its strongly proSouthern content. The fugitive act was passed as part of the Compromise of 1850, but it was not
a compromise on the issue of fugitive slaves. Specifically, the act authorized slave owners or
their agents to forcefully seize alleged fugitives and return them to the state from which they fled
with or without legal process.26 If the slave owner wished to utilize federal procedures, a
southern judge could issue a certificate that would conclusively establish the slave status of the
person mentioned therein for purposes of removal.27 This certificate could be presented to a
federal judge or commissioner in the North who would issue a warrant for the fugitive’s arrest.
Anyone who interfered with the arrest of a fugitive, attempted to rescue him, assisted the

Government's Relations to Slavery (New York : Oxford University Press, 2002), 240; Morris,
Free Men All; Streichler, Justice Curtis, 4. But see Cover, Justice Accused, 207; Allen Johnson,
“The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law,” Yale L. J. 31 (1921): 161-182. Alfred
Brophy has argued that Allen Johnson’s article, the most comprehensive academic writing in
support of the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, was part of the early twentieth
century movement to reargue the South’s cause in order to promote reconciliation between the
North and South rather than a scholarly examination of the constitutional theories of the 1850s.
See Alfred Brophy, “Jim Crow History in the Yale Law Journal,” (unpublished manuscript).
26

Ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) (repealed 1864).

27

Ibid., 465.
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fugitive’s escape, or concealed a fugitive was subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars and imprisonment not exceeding six months.28
Once arrested, the alleged fugitive slave faced proceedings before a federal
commissioner.29 The commissioner was paid five dollars if the alleged fugitive was found to be
free and ten if found to be a slave.30 Under no circumstances was the testimony of the alleged
fugitive to be admitted, and the fugitive was denied the right to a trial by jury.31 Finally, the
proceedings were deemed summary and final--no appeal or writ of habeas corpus was
permitted.32 The act thus armed the southern claimant with new procedures designed to aid in
rendition and, in response to many northern states’ withdrawal of cooperation, greatly increased
the federal government’s involvement by utilizing federal commissioners instead of relying on
state magistrates.
ii. Constitutional Theory and the Fugitive Slave Act
Antislavery advocates attacked the Fugitive Slave Act with at least three major lines of
argument. First, the antislavery bar argued that Congress was granted no power to legislate on

28

Ibid., 464.

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid., 463-64.

31

Ibid.

32

Ibid., 462.
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the subject of fugitive slaves.33 Under this argument, the Fugitive Slave Clause of the
Constitution was merely an obligation between the states. The clause stated: “No person held to
service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence
of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from any service or labor; but shall be delivered
up on claim of the party, to whom such service or labor may be due.”34 This clause obviously
gave no explicit grant of power to Congress. Moreover, the clause is found not in Article I,
which enumerates congressional power, but rather in Section 2 of Article IV, which is a series of
interstate comity provisions. Finally, since the framers explicitly granted Congress enforcement
power in other sections of Article IV, it could be inferred that the lack of such an explicit grant of
power in the Fugitive Slave Clause was intentional.
The second major line of argument against the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was
that it violated various provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the rights to a trial by
jury and due process of law.35 These arguments focused on the rights of free blacks in
the North. Because northerners were generally presumed to be free and Bill of Rights

33

See, e.g., Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 240-41; Salmon Chase, An Argument for the

Defendant in the Case of Wharton Jones v. John VanZandt (Cincinnati, 1847), 96-102; Robert
Rantoul, Jr., Memoirs, Speeches and Writings (Luther Hamilton, ed., Boston, 1854), 55-58.
34

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.

35

See, e.g., Chase, An Argument for the Defendant 93; Lysander Spooner, A Defense for

Fugitive Slaves, Against the Act of Congress of February 12, 1793, and September 18, 1850
(Boston, 1850), 6-9, 27-43.
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protections applied to all “persons,” rather than being limited to citizens, free blacks were
at least arguably entitled to constitutional protections.36
Of particular importance, antislavery lawyers often argued that the variable fee
paid to commissioners, which was doubled when the commissioner ruled against the
alleged fugitive, constituted a bribe and thus violated due process of law.37 Supreme
Court Justice John McLean, among others, argued in response that commissioners were
paid a higher fee when a fugitive was removed merely “as a compensation to the

36

See, e.g., Chase, An Argument for the Defendant, 89; Trial of Thomas Sims, on an Issue of

Personal Liberty, on the Claim of James Potter, of Georgia, Against Him, as an Alleged Fugitive
From Service: Arguments of Robert Rantoul, Jr. and Charles G. Loring, with the Decision of
George T. Curtis (Boston: WM. S. Damrell & Co., 1851), 34-36 (argument of Charles Loring).
37

See Lewis Tappan, The Fugitive Slave Bill: Its History and Unconstitutionality; With an

Account of the Seizure and Enslavement of James Hamlet (New York: William Harned, 1850),
21; “Trial of Henry W. Allen, U.S. Deputy Marshal, For Kidnapping, With Arguments of
Counsel & Charge of Justice Marvin, on the Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law”
(Syracuse: Power Press of the Daily Journal Office, 1852), 18 (printing the argument of Gerrit
Smith), in 1 Fugitive Slaves in American Courts: The Pamphlet Literature, ed. Paul Finkelman,
(New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988), 222; 2 Charles Sumner, Orations and
Speeches (Boston 1892), 402; Trial of Thomas Sims, 25 (argument of Charles Loring); “Fugitive
Slave Law,” The Liberator (Boston, Oct. 11, 1850); Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cass. 335 (1853),
339 (discussing the arguments of counsel).
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commissioner” for the extra time needed to write a certificate of removal.38 In fact,
judges in England and the states were routinely compensated with fee arrangements.39
The antislavery argument against variable compensation, however, cannot be
dismissed as completely outlandish. Judicial fees in England and the states were
ordinarily triggered at various stages throughout the course of litigation, such as when the
court served a summons or empanelled a jury, rather than being dependant on ruling in
favor of a particular party.40 Moreover, English common law cases, which were routinely

38

Miller, 339. Commissioner George T. Curtis, however, ruled that the fee arrangement was

permissible if the commissioner chose not to accept the higher fee, as accepting the fee was not
mandatory. Trial of Thomas Sims, 39.
39

James E. Pfander, “Judicial Compensation and the Definition of Judicial Power in the Early

Republic,” 107 Mich. L. Rev. (2008), 8; Daniel Klerman, “Jurisdictional Competition and the
Evolution of the Common Law,” 74 U. Chi. L. R. (2007), 1187; Thomas K. Urdahl, The Fee
System in the United States (Madison, Wis., Democrat Printing Co., 1898), 145, 151-52. The
constitutionality of awarding fees to federal judges of “inferior courts,” however, was
questionable under Article III. In fact, the Process Act, a federal statute that compensated
federal judicial officers the same as corresponding state judges, specifically excluded fees.
Pfander, “Judicial Compensation,” 14-19, 19 n.125, 133.
40

See Pfander, “Judicial Compensation,” 8, n.32 (describing early British and colonial fee

systems); Klerman, “Jurisdictional Competition,” 1187-88 (same); see also Tumey v. Ohio, 273
U.S. 510 (1926), 524, 531 (“We have been referred to no cases at common law in England prior
to the separation of colonies from the mother country showing a practice that inferior judicial
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used to interpret provisions of the Bill of Rights,41 held that it was impermissible for a
judge to have a financial interest in a case he was deciding, even if that stake was de
minimus.42 Although commissioners were required to perform more work when
remanding a fugitive, the higher fee still posed a risk of bias.
The third major argument against the Fugitive Slave Act, and perhaps the most
strenuously argued and persuasive argument put forth by the antislavery bar, was that the act
permitted Article III cases to be adjudicated by non-Article III judges.43 Federal commissioners

officers were dependent upon the conviction of the defendant for receiving their
compensation.”).
41

Murray’s Lessee v. Hobokin Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855), 277.

42

See, e.g., Hesketh v. Braddock, 3 Burr. 1847 (1766), 1856 (“There is no principle the in law

more settled than this--that any degree, even the smallest degree of interest in the question
depending, is a decisive objection to a witness, and much more to a juror, or to an officer to
whom the jury is returned. . . . The minuteness of the interest will not relax the objection. For,
the degrees of influence cannot be measured: no line can be drawn, but that of a total exclusion
of all degrees whatsoever.”). Although I have been unable to find a record of antislavery
advocates citing to such common law cases, these cases were available during the 1850s.
43

See, e.g., Rantoul, Memoirs, Speeches and Writings, 51-53; Trial of Thomas Sims, 1-14, 25-

34 (arguments of Robert Ranoul and Charles Loring); Tappan, The Fugitive Slave Bill, 28;
Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, 9-17; “Habeas Corpus Trial,” Daily Free Democrat
(Milwaukee, Wis.), June, 7, 1854 (printing the argument of Byron Paine, counsel for the
defendant in the case that culminated in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859)).

15

were empowered to decide cases under the fugitive act and thus arguably exercised federal
judicial power. The Constitution requires Article III judges to “hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and . . . receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.”44 Because the commissioners were appointed by federal
circuit courts, did not have lifetime tenure, and were paid a variable salary, the constitutional
validity of their new powers was questionable.
This argument seems plausible as well. Prior to the Fugitive Slave Act, federal
commissioners were authorized only to set bail, take affidavits and depositions, and arrest and
imprison suspected violators of federal law while awaiting trial--they were not empowered to
render final decisions in federal cases.45 The commissioners’ new powers were questionable, as
fugitive hearings arguably invoked federal judicial power and the Constitution requires such
power to be vested only in federal judges. Article III dictates that “the judicial power of the
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Congress may . .
. establish,”46 and Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee explicitly holds that Article III requires all federal

44

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

45

See Charles A. Lindquist, “The Origin and Development of the United States Commissioner

System,” 14 Am. J. Legal Hist. (1970), 6-8; An Act in addition to an act , entitled “An act for
the more convenient taking of affidavits and bail in civil causes, depending in the courts of the
United States” 3 Stat. 350 (1817); An Act further supplementary to an act entitled, “An act to
establish the judicial courts of the United States,” 5 Stat. 516 (1842).
46

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).

16

judicial power to be vested in a federal court.47 As antislavery lawyers argued, Justice Story
asserted in Prigg that fugitive slave hearings constituted cases “within the express delegation of
[federal] judicial power.”48 Antislavery advocates thus argued that because fugitive hearings
were a part of the federal judicial power, the Constitution required them to be heard by, or

47

14 U.S. 304 (1816), 331 (“The whole judicial power of the United States should be, at all

times, vested either in an original or appellate form, in some courts created under its authority.”).
For antislavery use of this argument, see Thomas H. Talbot, The Constitutional Provision
Respecting Fugitives From Service or Labor, and the Act of Congress, of September 18, 1850
(Boston, 1852), 78; Trial of Thomas Sims, 1, 15, 26 (arguments of Robert Rantoul and Charles
Loring).
48

Prigg, 616; Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, 9; Talbot, Fugitives From Service or

Labor, 77-78, 105; Trial of Thomas Sims, 4-5, 34 (arguments of Robert Rantoul and Charles
Loring). In addition to Justice Story’s declaration in Prigg, it seems plausible to think that
commissioners in fugitive slave hearings exercised federal judicial power under the test
announced in Murray’s Lessee v. Hobokin Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1855). In
Murray’s Lessee, the court held: “we do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial
cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in
equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which,
from its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.” Ibid., 284. In Jones v. Van Zandt,
the Supreme Court stated that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 “was only carrying out, in our
confederate form of government, the clear right of every man at common law to make fresh suit
and recapture of his own property within the realm.” 46 U.S. 215 (1847), 229 (emphasis added).

17

appealable to, a federal judge meeting the requirements of Article III. 49 Since the
commissioners’ decisions could not be appealed or otherwise reviewed, their new powers were
arguably unconstitutional.
Defenders of the act replied to the last two objections by claiming that hearings
before federal commissioners were preliminary, ministerial, and thus analogous to the
initial seizure of a fugitive from justice.50 Under this argument, commissioners did not
make final decisions regarding the alleged fugitives’ status; instead, they merely

49

See Spooner, A Defense for Fugitive Slaves, 15; Talbot, Fugitives From Service or Labor, 77-

84; Trial of Thomas Sims, 5-6 (argument of Robert Rantoul). Although other federal officers,
such as federal marshals, may have exercised quasi-judicial powers, their actions were reviewed
by, or appealable to, a federal court. Federal judicial power was thus vested in the court to which
the decision was appealed, just as state decisions involving a federal question could ultimately be
appealed to the Supreme Court.
50

See, e.g., Fehrenbacher, Slaveholding Republic, 242-43; Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cass. 335

(1853) (McLean, J.); “The Fugitive Slave Law,” Boston Daily Advertiser, Nov. 2, 1850 (printing
an exchange between Charles Gibbons and Supreme Court Justice Robert Grier); In re Charge to
the Grand Jury, 1011 (Nelson, J.); “The Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law,” Boston
Daily Advertiser, Nov. 19, 1850 (printing a speech of Benjamin Curtis, a lawyer who would be
appointed to the Supreme Court in 1851); “Argument of George Comstock in the Kidnapping
Case at Syracuse, upon the Constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law” (Syracuse 1852) 11, in 2
Fugitive Slaves in American Courts, 336; Trial of Thomas Sims, 42 (opinion of Commissioner
George T. Curtis).

18

authorized the extradition of alleged fugitives back to the state from which they fled,
where a southern court could make a final determination. Since the hearing was
ministerial, the right of trial by jury did not apply, the process due was minimal, and
commissioners did not exercise final federal judicial power. 51
This response, however, was by no means conclusive. The decision of the
commissioner was final in a way that extradition of a fugitive from justice was not.
Whereas extradition of a fugitive from justice was merely the first step in a
constitutionally regulated trial, the rendition of a fugitive slave was followed by no
further legal proceedings, as the fugitive was remanded to the owner’s private custody as
a slave.52 Moreover, the commissioner’s decision could not be appealed or questioned
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under habeas corpus proceedings.53 As Thomas H. Talbot argued, the commissioner’s
hearing was “preliminary to no other proceeding, ancillary to no other trial, [and]
ministerial to no other court.”54 Moreover, unlike a fugitive from justice, the act
authorized the removal of a person “held to service or labor” rather than a person charged
with being held to service, implying that the fugitive hearing determined the alleged
fugitive’s status.55 In fact, the only possible future proceeding--a suit brought by the
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alleged slave for his freedom in the South--would seem to be a wholly separate trial,
much like a prisoner bringing a habeas corpus petition.56 The commissioner’s decision
was thus arguably both final and judicial, and thus in violation of Article III and the Bill
of Rights.57
iii. Legal Precedent
Although several plausible constitutional arguments against the fugitive acts were
available, antislavery judges did not review the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 on a clean slate, and
it is thus necessary to consider whether legal precedent may have constrained their decisions.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania was the leading case on the subject of fugitive slaves. In Prigg, the jury
found by special verdict that Edward Prigg had removed Margaret Morgan and her children from
Pennsylvania as fugitive slaves without complying with the removal provisions of
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law, which established procedures for the recovery of fugitive
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slaves and punished the kidnapping of black residents.58 The jury also specifically found that
Margaret Morgan was in fact a fugitive slave.59 Relying on these findings, the Pennsylvanian
courts found that Prigg was guilty of kidnapping under Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law
because he had failed to comply with its removal procedures.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Justice Joseph Story, in what has been treated as the
opinion of the Court, ruled that it was unconstitutional for Pennsylvania to punish a master for
recovering his fugitive slaves.60 Justice Story’s ruling was based on two lines of argument.
First, Story held that the Constitution secures a master’s private right of recaption, which
empowers a master “in every State of the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he
can do it, without any breach of the peace or illegal violence.” 61 Story further found that “any
state law or state regulation, which interrupts, limits, delays or postpones the right of the owner
to the immediate possession of the slave” conflicts with the master’s right of private recaption. 62
Because the Pennsylvanian courts had interpreted the state’s personal liberty law to require a
master to comply with its procedures and thus punished Prigg for independently removing his
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fugitive slave, Story found that the personal liberty law conflicted with Prigg’s constitutional
right of recaption.63
The procedural posture of the case, however, drastically limited the implications of
Prigg’s right of recaption. In Prigg, the jury had already found that Margaret Morgan was in fact
a fugitive slave, and thus the right arguably applied only to admitted fugitives. Anything in
Story’s opinion which suggested that states could not protect their free black residents was
therefore dictum. The right of recaption was thus arguably consistent with alleged fugitives
having legal rights, such as due process and the right to a jury trial, when their status was in
dispute.
In Story’s second line of reasoning, he found that the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
preempted any state legislation on the subject of returning fugitive slaves, including
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law.64 In order to reach this conclusion, Story also held that the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional.65
Prigg’s ruling in favor of the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 clearly
eliminated the first antislavery argument explained above--that Congress was granted no power
under the Fugitive Slave Clause--and also called into question the applicability of Bill of Rights
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protections.66 The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 commanded a judge or magistrate to authorize the
removal of a person claimed as a fugitive slave “upon proof to the satisfaction of such Judge or
magistrate” that the person claimed was in fact a fugitive slave.67 Since the determination was
made by the judge or magistrate, the act clearly did not contemplate a trial by jury, and thus
Prigg seems to preclude one of the antislavery bar’s most popular arguments.
However, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 did not utilize federal commissioners or pay
variable fees to federal officers, and thus, despite some argument to the contrary, no ruling on the
1793 act could prejudice these two remaining antislavery arguments. Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw
of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, among others, argued that since Prigg upheld
the use of state magistrates under the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, it upheld the use of federal
commissioners by analogy.68 He reasoned that although both positions were given similar quasijudicial powers, neither satisfied Article III standards. Article III’s requirements, however, apply
only to federal judges. It thus could be argued that the Constitution requires Congress to either
use state officers to enforce its laws or create federal judges with Article III protections.69 There
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was thus ample room for the argument that state officers were not strictly analogous to federal
commissioners and therefore Prigg did not control the issue.
iv. The Judicial Role in the Nineteenth Century
Although the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act was ambiguous, it may be that
nineteenth century constraints on the judiciary foreclosed a ruling against it. As explained
above, the traditional view is that the nineteenth century judiciary upheld proslavery legislation
because it rejected antislavery arguments based on natural law or morality.70 However, even
though antislavery advocates did frequently argue in terms of natural law,71 many of their
arguments were based solely on positive law. In fact, none of the three arguments set out above
relies on natural law or rules of interpretation based on morality; instead, each utilizes only
traditional legal sources such as constitutional text and interpretation. The reluctance of
eighteenth century jurists to accept natural rights arguments thus does not challenge the
contention that the fugitive act was of questionable constitutionality.
Another possible judicial constraint was the prevailing conception of judicial review.
According to conventional wisdom, by the mid-nineteenth century the Supreme Court had found
only one act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and the law in question was merely a law
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regarding the Court’s own jurisdiction.72 It thus could be argued that the courts did not exercise
meaningful review of federal legislation.73
In the first several decades of the Court’s existence, judicial review was a limited practice
that bears little resemblance to the modern doctrine. Judicial review was initially viewed by
many as a political and revolutionary act that relied on fundamental principles of law that were
embodied in the Constitution rather than the constitutional text itself.74 As a result of Chief
Justice John Marshal’s interpretation of the Constitution as supreme written law, however,
distinctions between ordinary law and the Constitution blurred.75 Judicial review of legislation
thus became widely accepted and was often utilized against state legislation, though jurists
generally restricted its scope to the “concededly unconstitutional act.”76
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The scope and perceived legitimacy of judicial review, however, expanded dramatically
during the first half of the nineteenth century.77 The Court first moved beyond the concededly
unconstitutional act in cases involving the Supremacy Clause and the Contract Clause. In these
cases, Chief Justice Marshal interpreted the constitutional text as ordinary law and enforced this
interpretation even against plausible alternative interpretations made by state legislatures. 78 At
first, other justices on the Court joined in Chief Justice Marshal’s opinions only because they
agreed with his ultimate holdings. The justices used the legal doctrine of vested rights, which
they viewed as fundamental law, to reach Chief Justice Marshal’s Contract Clause conclusions
and agreed that the Court was given unique authority to resolve certain disputes with the states in
the Supremacy Clause.79 Although the Court may have shown more deference to Congress than
the states and tended to avoid politically divisive issues,80 by mid-century Chief Justice
Marshal’s practices had begun to take root and the stage was set for meaningful judicial review
outside the vested rights and federalism contexts.81
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Dred Scott v. Sanford, decided merely seven years after the passage of the Fugitive Slave
Act, proves that judicial review was sufficiently robust by mid-century to allow judges with
sufficient motivation to strike down constitutionally ambiguous federal legislation. In Dred
Scott, the Supreme Court ruled that federal legislation passed in the Missouri Compromise was
unconstitutional.82 The judges who formed the proslavery majority certainly did not rule against
a “concededly unconstitutional act,” as the decision has historically been condemned as
unreasoned and even its modern defenders admit that the constitutional law involved was
ambiguous.83 If judges who preferred a proslavery ruling could use ambiguous constitutional
doctrine to strike down federal legislation in Dred Scott, then it is hard to understand why
antislavery judges could not have done the same regarding the Fugitive Slave Act.
The public reaction to Dred Scott is also revealing. Although countless critics attacked
the constitutional merits of the decision, few questioned the Court’s power to render it.84 Indeed,
many of the decision’s supporters self-servingly asserted that the Court had the power to render a
final interpretation of all constitutional issues that came before it.85 If the prevailing view in the
legal community had been that judicial review of federal legislation was improper or only
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justified in extreme cases, this likely would have been a common criticism of the decision. The
lack of such criticism seems to imply that judicial review of congressional legislation, even
constitutionally ambiguous and politically divisive legislation, was a generally accepted function
of the judicial role at mid-century.
Nor can Dred Scott merely be dismissed as an outlier. The traditional account of judicial
review of congressional legislation before the Civil War--that of nearly complete deference to
Congress--has recently come under attack.86 This revisionist scholarship demonstrates not only
that the Court invalidated several statutes prior to the 1850s,87 but, more importantly, the Court
also regularly reviewed the constitutionality of federal legislation and often limited or rewrote
statutes to avoid constitutional boundaries.88 Like the Court’s review of state legislation, most of
these cases involved the institution of the judiciary or federalism issues; however, the Court’s
review occasionally extended to matters relating to individual rights as well.89 Even though few
statutes had been wholly invalidated on constitutional grounds, by the 1850s the Court had
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become an established forum for raising constitutional issues and imposing constitutional
limitations on federal legislation.90
Although the judicial role in the nineteenth century cannot explain why antislavery
judges upheld the fugitive act, it may explain why they claimed that they were helpless to rule
against it. Much more than today, the judicial function was perceived to be one of an oracle of
the law, where judges identified timeless and immutable legal principles and applied them to
specific cases.91 Under this view, a judge could not be held morally responsible for his
decisions, as he merely found rather than made the law. As modern legal thought has made
clear, however, judges do have discretion when legal issues are ambiguous. Their decisions are
thus often influenced by policy preferences, even if unconsciously. The judges’ claims that the
positive law forced them to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act thus merely reflect the nineteenth
century conception of the judicial role and should not be seen as particularly convincing.
v. Respectability of Arguments Against the Fugitive Slave Act
Even if a logical case could be made against the Fugitive Slave Act, social mores could
have prevented a serious inquiry.92 In other words, social rather than legal factors may have
constrained the judges. For example, it would be unrealistic to expect an antebellum judge, even
one strongly committed to antislavery values, to accept Lysander Spooner’s argument that the
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Constitution prohibited slavery. Given the social practices of the antebellum era, Spooner’s
argument was simply not in the realm of available options.
For several reasons, however, the Fugitive Slave Act was not so socially accepted that
arguments against it could be discountenanced as unrealistic or out of touch with reality. First,
striking down the Fugitive Slave Act would not have been out of step with prevailing moral
sentiment in the North. Although most northerners accepted slavery as a fundamental American
institution, fugitive slaves that managed to escape into the North were viewed sympathetically
and slave catchers were generally viewed as morally corrupt profiteers.93 In fact, given the
massive demonstrations against fugitive slave renditions such as those of Anthony Burns and
Joshua Glover, it is clear that many northerners morally opposed the return of fugitive slaves and
some even rejected the legal duty despite its explicit mention in the Constitution.94
Second, the Fugitive Slave Act conflicted with traditional northern legal norms. As
explained above, the Fugitive Slave Act denied anyone accused of being a fugitive slave even the
most fundamental of legal protections, effectively creating a presumption of slavery in the
North.95 The law was thus at odds with the common northern presumption that all men,
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regardless of race, were free.96 Moreover, the act flew in the face of decades of state legislation
designed, at least in part, to protect free blacks from kidnapping.97 Many Northerners had long
been angered over Southern kidnapping of free black residents.98 An antislavery judge that
demanded some protection for free blacks in the North would only have been extending existing
northern legal principles.99
Third, in the early 1850s, when the judges first considered the law, the Fugitive Slave Act
was not so politically popular as to be beyond examination. The act passed only because of
strong southern support--thirty-one Northerners voted for the act in the House while seventy-six
voted against it.100 After the act’s passage, many prominent northerners, comprising a majority
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in some geographical areas, violently condemned the law.101 And though the deeply unpopular
abolitionists formed the core of this opposition, many mainstream political leaders and
newspapers also took part.102 In fact, a large number of northern Whigs opposed the law,
including a majority of Whigs from states such as Ohio and New York.103 Daniel Webster, one
of the most powerful politicians in the country, devastated his reputation in the North, and
especially in his home state of Massachusetts, by endorsing the law.104
Due to the influence of many northern politicians, urban businessmen, and clergymen,
however, most northerners probably found the law’s harsh provisions distasteful but ultimately
acquiesced in order to avoid conflict with the South.105 Political leaders such as Daniel Webster
argued that support for the Fugitive Slave Act would “rebuk[e] that spirit of faction and
disunion” that imperiled the country, and Congress even passed a resolution declaring the
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Compromise measures to be a final adjustment of sectional issues.106 Most northern ministers
also supported the law, and many urged their congregations to abide by its terms for the sake of
the Union.107 Moreover, urban businessmen, many of whom disapproved of slavery and the
terms of the fugitive act, organized mass Union meetings and otherwise exerted their influence in
favor of the act out of fear that disobedience to the law could disrupt commercial ties with the
South.108
Public opinion in the North was thus not overwhelmingly supportive of the fugitive act;
instead, many opposed the law while others found it distasteful and accepted it only as a
necessary expedient to reduce the risk of disunion. A judge who ruled against the law thus
would not have been completely out of step with northern public opinion. In fact, in
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Massachusetts and Ohio, the states in which the judges examined in this paper lived, they likely
would have received substantial mainstream political support.
In sum, while a majority of northerners accepted the law, many found it to be immoral,
against traditional legal principles, and acceptable only because they thought it was necessary to
appease the South. It thus seems that, unlike a ruling against the institution of slavery, striking
down the fugitive act would not have been socially untenable in the North. The only social
obstacle to such a ruling was thus the judges’ own inclinations, which of course were influenced
by the same forces that shaped public opinion, including the political reality that a failure to
enforce the fugitive act would have threatened the Union.
vi. State Court Rulings Against the Fugitive Acts
The conclusion that prominent antislavery judges had the ability to rule against the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 is reinforced by the fact that several relatively obscure state judges
used traditional legal principles to rule against it. In 1854, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional and released a federal prisoner accused
of rescuing a fugitive slave.109 Writing for the court, Chief Justice Edward V. Whiton held that
the fugitive act violated the right to a trial by jury and gave judicial powers to commissioners in
violation of Article III.110 In a concurring opinion, Judge Abraham D. Smith also argued that
Congress lacked power to legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause.111 In addition, two
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dissenting Ohio Supreme Court judges adopted each of the arguments used by the Wisconsin
judges in the 1859 case of Ex parte Bushnell.112
Some commentators have incorrectly argued that the Wisconsin and Ohio judges
ruled against the Fugitive Slave Act only by ignoring established legal doctrine.113 This
is because Judge Smith and the Ohio dissenters justified their decisions with a states’
rights view of federalism that permitted state courts to reach constitutional decisions
independently of federal precedent.114 However, although this states’ rights doctrine did
violate established legal principles, it was not directly related to the courts’ rulings
against the fugitive act or even mentioned in Chief Justice Whiton’s opinion for the
Wisconsin Supreme Court. In fact, Chief Justice Whiton went to great lengths to
distinguish his opinion from Prigg and other fugitive slave precedents.115
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Judge Smith and the Ohio dissenters likely employed states’ rights only because,
by the time they encountered the Fugitive Slave Act, it was clear that the Supreme Court
would probably uphold it.116 The state judges thus probably used states’ rights as a way
to justify their decisions despite nearly certain reversal.117 Contrary to the traditional
account, these judges were thus forced to violate formal legal principles only because
prominent antislavery judges like Justice McLean had already chosen to uphold the act.
The actions of these state court judges thus demonstrate that an antislavery judge could
have ruled against the Fugitive Slave Act if he had the desire to do so.
III.

Inclination of the Antislavery Judges

No prominent antislavery judge that encountered the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of
first impression, however, had the inclination to strike it down. The two most significant
antislavery jurists of the 1850s, Justice John McLean and Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, probably personally supported the act as a matter of
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public policy.118 In fact, after upholding the act, they even went out of their way to remand
fugitives to slavery. Given the political context of the era, the positions of their respective
political parties, and their own statements, it is likely that the justices’ decisions were influenced
by a belief that the act’s enforcement was necessary in order to preserve the Union.119
i.
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There is no question that John McLean, who served as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court from 1830 to 1861, was morally opposed to slavery.120 Before being appointed
to the Supreme Court in 1830, and while not a wealthy man, he purchased and freed several
slaves with his personal funds.121 Like many northerners, he was also an ardent opponent of
slavery’s expansion in the territories.122 Salmon P. Chase, an important antislavery leader in the
antebellum era, called McLean “the most reliable man, on the slavery question, now prominent
in either party.”123
McLean’s judicial decisions also reveal his antislavery credentials. In Ohio v. Carneal,
while serving as a Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court in 1817, McLean called slavery “an
infringement upon the sacred rights of man” and ruled that any slave whose labor was used for
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profit in Ohio was made free under the Ohio Constitution.124 McLean is perhaps best known for
his dissent in Dred Scott v. Sanford, where he argued that blacks could be United States citizens
and Congress could ban slavery in the territories.125
McLean also issued the sole dissent in Prigg, where he argued that Pennsylvania’s
personal liberty law was a valid inquiry into whether the person claimed was in fact a fugitive
slave.126 He argued that there was “no conflict between the law of the state and the law of
congress” because the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 reached only fugitive slaves while the personal
liberty law applied to free blacks.127 He reasoned that since all people in Pennsylvania were
presumed to be free, the slave owner had no legal rights under the Fugitive Slave Clause or
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 until he had proven that the alleged fugitive was in fact a slave using
the proper legal procedures.128
After his dissent in Prigg, however, McLean issued a number of opinions while riding
circuit on a federal appellate court that upheld the fugitive slave acts and returned fugitive slaves
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to bondage. Most of these cases were decided under the old Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,129
which had been upheld in Prigg. As the conventional view points out, McLean was obligated to
follow Prigg as binding precedent and thus had no discretion to rule against the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793.
McLean also comprehensively upheld the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 while riding circuit in Miller v. McQuerry.130 Prominent antislavery lawyers John Jolliffe
and James Birney raised each major argument discussed above while representing the alleged
fugitive.131 Not only did McLean hold that Prigg precluded many of these arguments, such as
the lack of congressional power and the right to a trial by jury, but he also defended the Court’s
reasoning.132 McLean also adopted the standard response to the arguments against the new role
of federal commissioners discussed above: he argued that commissioners were not Article III

129

Norris v. Newton, 18 F. Cass. 322 (1850); Ray v. Donnell, 20 F. Cass. 325 (1849); Giltner v.

Gorham, 10 F. Cass. 424 (1848); Vaughan v. Williams, 28 F. Cass. 1115 (1845); Jones v.
VanZandt, 13 F. Cass. 1047 (1843).
130

17 F. Cass. 335 (1853).

131

Ibid., 335, 337, 339; accord “The Fugitive Slave Case,” Cincinnati Daily Enquirer (Aug. 18,

1853) (summarizing several of counsel’s arguments); “A Fugitive Precedent,” The Columbian
Great West (Cincinnati, Aug. 27, 1853) (same); “Fugitive Slave Case,” Cincinnati Daily Times
(Aug. 17, 1853) (“The usual Constitutional objections to the law were urged with clearness and
ability.”).
132

Miller, 337-40.

41

judges because they rendered only preliminary determinations, and the variable fee was merely
compensation for the extra work required to remand fugitives.133
The traditional explanation for this decision is that legal considerations forced McLean to
uphold the act despite his personal views.134 Although McLean did appeal to positivism to
defend his opinion,135 as explained above, legal factors such as precedent did not compel a
proslavery ruling. Based on the language used in his opinions, his personal correspondence, his
eagerness to rule in favor of southern claimants, and his political affiliations, McLean was
probably inclined to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 because he believed strict
enforcement was necessary to preserve the Union.
Throughout his fugitive slave opinions, McLean extolled the value of the Union and
suggested that observance of the Fugitive Slave Act was essential to its preservation. For
example, in Miller, McLean explained that the framers “understood the federal and state powers
too well, not to know that without some effective [federal] provision on this subject, the
superstructure which they were about to rear would soon be overthrown.”136 Moreover, while
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urging the jury to follow the provisions of the Fugitive Slave Act in Ray v. Donnell, McLean
declared: “The constitution has made us one people, a nation--a great nation; . . . if we shall
maintain its principles in the same spirit which led to its formation, our country will be advanced
to a height of prosperity . . . . If the guarantees of this fundamental law [including the Fugitive
Slave Clause] be disregarded, all our hopes for the future, as regards the prosperity, the
greatness, and the glory of our country must perish.”137 Other cases contain similar appeals to
the value of the Union and warn of the risk of its disruption posed by northerners who
disregarded the duty to return fugitive slaves.138
McLean’s view of the importance of the fugitive clause at the constitutional convention
lends further insight into his fugitive slave decisions. McLean repeatedly asserted in his
opinions that “without a provision on the subject [of fugitive slaves] no constitution could have
been adopted.”139 This was a common belief among nineteenth century jurists.140 In reality,
however, the fugitive clause was not an important provision at the convention--it was adopted
with little debate, as part of no constitutional deal, and with no serious opposition.141 The
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framers were either too tired to debate the issue or simply did not anticipate its importance.142
McLean and other antebellum jurists likely adopted such a clear historical error only because
they understood that the clause had become an essential term of the Union in 1850.143
McLean’s personal letters are also revealing. In one particularly telling letter written in
November of 1850, McLean responded to a seemingly hostile minister who argued that returning
fugitive slaves to their masters was immoral. 144 McLean defended the morality of the new
Fugitive Slave Act by arguing that remanding fugitive slaves was necessary to preserve the
Union.145 He started with the familiar refrain that “the constitution could not be adopted without
the clause requiring the surrender of fugitives from labor. . . . Had this great measure failed, the
fruits of the revolution would have been lost.” Calling the Constitution “the parent of many
blessings to our country,” he asked, “[i]f we disregard its provisions, how can we of the free
states require obedience to it from the South[?]” He finally stated that he would not object to “a
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modification of [the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850’s] objectionable provisions which shall not
defeat or impair efficiency in carrying out the provisions of the constitution. [However,] [i]f this
object shall not be attained, I have no doubt that the ruin of our government and country will
follow.” It thus appears that McLean felt that an effective fugitive law was essential to
preserving peace and Union, which outweighed the harm of returning fugitives to slavery.
It is important to stress that, unlike in his judicial opinions, McLean was arguing in moral
rather than legal terms in this letter. Although McLean did appeal to positivism, such as
claiming that “enforcement of th[e] ‘higher law’ caused more wars and bloodshed in the world,
than all other causes united,” it is hard to view this statement as motivating his conclusion. Not
only did McLean’s letter offer no legal argument for the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave
Act, but he also asserted that, at the time he wrote the letter, he had “scarcely read” the act. It is
telling that he was predisposed to support the act before he had even bothered to read its
provisions.146 Thus, while he occasionally appealed to the values of legal positivism, McLean’s
overriding argument was that adherence to the new fugitive act was desirable as a matter of
policy.
The claim that McLean personally supported enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act is
reinforced by the fact that he stretched to enforce its provisions even when not required to do so
by law. In Norris v. Newton, a fugitive slave case in which McLean ruled while riding circuit in
1850, John Norris, a Kentucky slave owner, seized Lucy Powell and her three sons as fugitive
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slaves without the use of legal process.147 While traveling near South Bend, Indiana, a sheriff,
accompanied by a large group of armed men, served Norris with a writ of habeas corpus and,
after a brief armed standoff, escorted him to a state court in South Bend. In his return of the writ,
Norris justified his detention of the Powells by alleging that he held them as his fugitive slaves.
The Powells excepted to the sufficiency of Norris’ return---meaning that they claimed that
Norris’ return, even if taken as true, did not justify their detention---on the grounds that a master
could only remove his fugitives after taking them before a judge or magistrate and obtaining a
certificate of removal as specified in the Fugitive Slave Act.148
Apparently unaware of the private right of recaption established in Prigg, the state judge
ruled in favor of the Powells. Upon hearing this ruling, Norris and his companions grabbed the
Powells, drew their weapons, warned the crowd in the courthouse not to approach, and arrested
the Powells under Indiana’s personal liberty law. The state judge subsequently discharged the
Powells on the grounds that Prigg invalidated Indiana’s personal liberty law, and a crowd
escorted them out of the city. Rather than pursue the Powells or attempt to obtain a certificate of
removal, Norris sued the Powells’ attorney and several others in federal court for the loss of his
slaves.149
In his charge to the jury, McLean bended both the law and the facts to ensure that the jury
imposed severe financial penalties on the citizens of South Bend who had aided the Powells.150
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In a questionable statement of the law, McLean instructed the jury that “the discharge of the
fugitives by the judge was void, and, consequently, can give no protection to those who acted
under it.”151 McLean reached this conclusion by reasoning that, in failing to deny Norris’ claim
of ownership in their exception to the sufficiency of Norris’s return of the writ, the Powells had
admitted to being his slaves. Since a master has the right to arrest and hold his slaves, the state
judge “could exercise no further jurisdiction in this case.”152 McLean thus ultimately concluded
that any person who “aided, by words or actions, the movement which resulted in the escape of
the fugitives” was liable even if they were merely enforcing the orders of the state court.
The state court’s orders, however, at least arguably should have shielded the defendants
from liability. The weight of nineteenth century legal authority seems to indicate that an order
from a court of valid subject matter and personal jurisdiction was a conclusive defense to any
suit arising from its enforcement, even if the decision was later found to be erroneous.153
Although McLean couched his ruling in terms of jurisdiction, the Powells’ supposed admission
went to the merits of the case rather than the court’s power to adjudicate the dispute. McLean
actually admitted that the court had jurisdiction by stating that the state judge had the power to
issue the writ of habeas corpus and discharge the prisoners if the master presented insufficient
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proof.154 The Powells’ admission perhaps should have immediately resolved the case in Norris’
favor, but it is hard to see how it could have defeated the state court’s power to render a
judgment. Moreover, Indiana law was not even clear on the issue of whether a fact not refuted in
an exception to a return of habeas corpus should be treated as an admission.155 Consequently,
McLean could have instructed the jury that the state court’s orders, though erroneous, served as a
complete defense.
McLean also presented a critical factual issue in a biased manner. McLean went out of
his way to discredit the Powells’ claim to freedom based on principles of interstate comity. By
the 1850s it was established law in Kentucky, Norris’s home state, that when a master permitted
his slave to enter a Free State he was liberated under its laws.156 Credible evidence was
presented at trial that Norris had allowed the Powells to raise their own crops and sell them in
Indiana, including admissions made by Norris to citizens of South Bend in order to show that he
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was a kind master.157 While commenting on the evidence, however, McLean made it clear that
he thought the evidence was insufficient to support the Powells’ claim. 158
In a mixed issue of law and fact, McLean also failed to allow the jury to consider whether
Norris’ custody of the Powells complied with the requirements of Prigg. Under Prigg, a slave
owner could reclaim a fugitive without the aid of legal process only if done “without any breach
of the peace or any illegal violence.”159 Instead of instructing the jury on this issue, McLean
accepted Norris’s assertion that the Powells were willing to peacefully return to slavery at face
value despite substantial evidence to the contrary.160 Moreover, McLean completely ignored the
armed confrontations that occurred both when Norris was initially served with the writ of habeas

157

See The South Bend Fugitive Slave Case, Involving the Right to Habeas Corpus (New York:

Anti-Slavery Office, 1851) 7; History of St. Joseph County (Chicago: Chas. C. Chapman & Co.,
1880), 618.
158

See Norris, 325-26; Finkelman, “Fugitive Slaves,” 114. For example, McLean stated that

there was “no express evidence” that Norris had given the Powells permission to travel to
Indiana and that Norris’s alleged admissions were “disproved by persons who were present, and
who give an entirely different construction to the words of the plaintiff.” Norris, 325-26.
159

Prigg, 613.

160

Norris and his companions allegedly broke into the Powells’ residence and violently seized

and bound them at gunpoint while armed men prevented other residents from leaving the house
to raise an alarm. The South Bend Fugitive Slave Case, 1; Finkelman, “Fugitive Slaves,” 108.

49

corpus and when the judge announced his decision. Any of these incidents perhaps could have
been found to constitute a breach of the peace, thus negating Norris’ private right of recaption.161
In Norris, McLean thus stretched both the law and the facts to insure that a decision was
reached that both appeased the southern claimant and discouraged northerners from lending aid
to fugitive slaves in the future, including legal representation. Following the conventional view,
one commentator concludes that McLean “did not choose between liberty and slavery,” but
rather was forced to choose between liberty and formal principles of law.162 As explained above,
however, formal principles of law favored freedom at least as much as slavery. In fact, McLean
seems to have distorted formal legal principles in order to rule in favor of the southern claimant.
McLean’s decision thus must have been influenced by non-legal considerations. Given his
opposition to slavery, McLean likely took into consideration the political consequences of a
Supreme Court Justice ruling against the southern claimant.
McLean’s approval of the Fugitive Slave Act should not be surprising given his political
affiliations. Referred to as a “Politician on the Supreme Court” by his biographer, McLean
maintained presidential ambitions throughout his life.163 In 1848 McLean identified with the
Whig Party and strongly desired the Whig presidential nomination.164 The Whig Party was split
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on opinion regarding the Fugitive Slave Act in the early 1850s, but the majority favored
supporting it to maintain sectional unity.165 When the Republican Party formed in the mid
1850s, McLean joined its ranks and received strong conservative support for the Republican
presidential nomination in 1856.166 And although public opinion in the North became much
more hostile to the Fugitive Slave Act after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854,167
the national Republican Party never officially called for its nullification or repeal. In fact,
Lincoln, himself a moderate Republican, pledged to see it enforced.168 McLean’s desire to see
the Fugitive Slave Act enforced because of considerations of Union thus fit well with the
moderate elements of the political parties that he hoped to lead.
There is one piece of evidence, though, that seems to support the traditional view that
McLean upheld the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 for legal reasons: his dissent in Prigg when the
Supreme Court first interpreted the Fugitive Slave Clause. It could be claimed that McLean’s
dissent demonstrates that he opposed the fugitive act as a matter of first impression but was
forced to later uphold the act because of stare decisis.169 There are at least two reasons to think,
however, that McLean may have been influenced by policy considerations despite his dissent in
Prigg.
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First, it is important to recognize the limited nature of McLean’s dissent. At no point did
he question the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793; instead, he merely refused to
recognize a master’s right to seize an alleged fugitive without legal process in violation of a state
law designed to prevent kidnapping.170 In fact, McLean rejected one of the most persuasive
arguments against the fugitive slave acts by agreeing with the Court that Congress was given
power to legislate under the Fugitive Slave Clause.171 Moreover, while Story had cast doubt on
whether Congress could enlist state officers to enforce the act, McLean unambiguously stated
that “in the case of fugitives from labor and from justice, they have the power to do so.”172 If
McLean’s position on the enlistment issue had prevailed, the North’s personal liberty laws,
which withdrew state assistance in the rendition process, would have been invalidated. Because
McLean’s dissent was so limited, his subsequent support for the fugitive act of 1850 was not a
major change in opinion.
Second, McLean’s dissent in Prigg, written in 1842, was written in a very different
political context than his later fugitive slave opinions. Sectional tensions had reached a new
height in 1850, and the fugitive slave issue was a major point of contention. Because the South
threatened disunion in the Georgia Platform if the new fugitive act was not strictly enforced,
McLean was probably much more impressed with the political significance of the issue in the
early 1850s. As a prominent public official who spent time in the nation’s capital and had strong
political ambitions, McLean was surely well aware of this political reality. McLean even
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received a letter from an acquaintance from Charleston, South Carolina, who warned that “if the
agitation is continued, the days of the republic are numbered.” 173 In response, McLean asserted
that he had “observed with great anxiety, the rise in progress of this agitation [on slavery].”174
ii.

Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw

Lemuel Shaw, who served as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts from 1830 to 1860, is one of the most famous and influential state judges in
American history.175 His influence on American slavery jurisprudence was no exception. In the
case of Commonwealth v. Aves, Shaw, setting an antislavery precedent that would be adopted
throughout much of the North, ruled that slaves voluntarily brought into Massachusetts “for any
temporary purpose of business or pleasure” were entitled to their freedom.176 He reasoned that
slavery, “being contrary to natural right, and effected by local law, is dependant upon such local
law for its existence and efficacy.”177 His slavery jurisprudence was shaped by his belief that
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slavery was “utterly irreconcilable with any notions of natural justice” and “an evil of great
magnitude.”178
Though Shaw was an avowed opponent of slavery, he consistently upheld the provisions
of the fugitive slave acts and returned fugitives to bondage.179 According to his biographer,
Leonard Levy, “Shaw felt duty bound to enforce the Constitution as law regardless of whatever
moral twinges he may have experienced” and regarded the return of runaways as a “legal
necessity.”180 Shaw’s explanation of his own decisions thus conforms to the conventional
account of a judge forced to uphold proslavery legislation in order to be faithful to his judicial
role.
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under Prigg. Ibid., 78-82. In Sims’ Case, 61 Mass. 285 (1851), Shaw upheld the
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However, as Levy explains: “There exists no statement from Shaw that he, like Webster,
Choate, and Curtis, approved of the Fugitive Slave Law as an expedient to cement sectional
differences that menaced the Union; yet there is nothing in the cast of the man’s mind,
temperament, or associations suggesting that his judicial obligation to enforce Congressional law
necessarily conflicted with his personal opinions.”181 In fact, there is much reason to think that
Shaw personally approved of the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of public policy.
Shaw’s opinion in Sims’ Case, in which he upheld the constitutionality of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 against an exhaustive attack by Robert Rantoul, is
instructive.182 Rather than merely justifying his decision with legal positivism and
expressing his regret at being forced to uphold the act, he defended the country’s policy
regarding fugitive slaves as necessary to preserve the Union. Shaw explained: “The
constitution, therefore, is not responsible for the origin or continuance of slavery. The
provision it contains [the Fugitive Slave Clause] was the best adjustment which could be
made of conflicting rights and claims, and was absolutely necessary to effect what may
now be considered as the general pacification, by which harmony and peace should take
the place of violence and war.”183
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Unpacking this passage reveals three of Shaw’s fundamental beliefs on fugitive
slaves. First, Shaw, like most prominent jurists of the antebellum era, believed that the
fugitive clause was “absolutely necessary” for the formation of the Union. As explained
above, it is likely that this historical error was reinforced, and perhaps motivated, by an
awareness that the fate of the Union did depend on enforcement of the fugitive clause in
1850.184 Second, he reveals a high valuation of the Union in asserting that it was
necessary to avoid “violence and war” between the states.
Third, by arguing that the fugitive clause was the “best adjustment which could be
made” between the interests of the Free and Slave States, Shaw seems to be asserting
that, given the existence of slavery at the time of the founding, the fugitive clause was a
normatively desirable provision at that time. Given the rising sectional tensions in the
1850s that made “violence and war” between the states much more likely than in the
eighteenth century, there is little reason to believe that Shaw would have changed his
mind about the desirability of the Fugitive Slave Clause. Although support for the
Fugitive Slave Clause is not necessarily the same as support for the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, it does reveal that Shaw believed that the duty to return fugitive slaves was a
necessary compromise with the South.
Shaw’s extra-judicial statements also support the conclusion that he approved of
the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of policy. Although Shaw’s personal papers reveal no
extra-judicial statement on the issue during his service as a judge, an article in the North
American Review, published before his term on the court, lends rare insight into Shaw’s
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moderate antislavery viewpoint. In this article, Shaw asserted that “[s]lavery, though a
great and acknowledged evil, must be regarded, to a certain extent, as a necessary one,
too deeply interwoven into the texture of society to be wholly or speedily eradicated.”185
He thus argued against immediate abolition and counseled that the government should
instead focus on “attainable good” and “not blindly overlook the only practicable means
of arriving at it.”186 Although he did not directly address the issue of fugitive slaves,
from these passages it is clear that Shaw favored a moderate antislavery approach that
would not threaten the established order. It is thus reasonable to infer that, as a matter of
policy, he might have supported the duty to return fugitive slaves as a necessary
condition of Union with the slave states, just as he viewed slavery itself as a necessary
institution in the South to prevent violence and social disruption.
Soon after Shaw retired from the court, at the height of the secession crisis in
1860, he signed an appeal to the people of Massachusetts, asking that they repeal the
state’s personal liberty law. Shaw and his co-signers urged repeal of the law and
compliance with the Fugitive Slave Act, claiming that they acted “under [their] own love
of right ; under [their]own sense of the sacredness of compacts ; [and] under [their] own
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conviction of the inestimable importance of social order and domestic peace . . . .”187
Shaw thus advocated adherence to the Fugitive Slave Act as a matter of policy in order to
stop the threat of southern secession. It is reasonable to infer that he may have supported
the act during the turbulent 1850s for the same reason.
Moreover, like McLean, Shaw not only upheld the Fugitive Slave Act on
constitutional grounds, but he also stretched to reach proslavery results in specific
fugitive cases. In 1851, just months after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act, federal
officials arrested Frederick Jenkins, also known as Shadrach, as a fugitive slave in
Boston, a city that had yet to remand a single fugitive slave to the South. Just as the
southern claimant wished to use this as a test case for enforcement of the Fugitive Slave
Act, Richard Henry Dana and other prominent antislavery lawyers in Boston hoped to use
it as a test case for the act’s constitutionality.188 After Shadrach was placed in federal
custody at the Boston courthouse, Dana drafted writs of habeas corpus and de homine
replegiando and personally delivered them to Chief Justice Shaw.
Shaw denied Dana’s attempt to challenge the act by insisting on unnecessarily
strict adherence to procedural formalities. According to Dana, Shaw at first refused to act
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on the writs because the petition was not personally signed by Shadrach.189 After Dana
pointed out that the statute did not require a signature, Shaw protested that there was no
evidence that the petition had been approved by Shadrach.190 After refusing to tell Dana
what proof of authority was required, Shaw next denied the writs because the petition
showed “that the man is in legal custody of a United States marshal.”191 To this, Dana
correctly replied that the government has the burden of proving legal detention, and thus
the fact of custody could not defeat the writs. Finally, Shaw denied the writs because
“the petition should contain a copy of the warrant, or state that a copy had been applied
for and could not be had.”192 Shortly after Shaw’s refusal to grant the writs, Shadrach
was forcibly rescued from the marshals’ custody and escaped to the North, rendering the
case moot.
Shaw’s actions indicate that he may have preferred to deny Shadrach’s claim to
freedom rather than antagonize sectional relations. It is, of course, possible that Shaw
simply disliked Dana for some unrelated reason or that Dana inaccurately reported the
encounter. However, Shaw’s shifting excuses, inaccurate and prejudicial statements of
law, and strict insistence on procedural formalities all provide at least some evidence that

189

Ibid., 180; 2 The Journal of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., Robert F. Lucid, ed. (Cambridge: The

Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1968), 411.
190

Adams, Richard Henry Dana, 181; Lucid, Journal of Richard Henry Dana, 411.

191

Adams, Richard Henry Dana, 181; Lucid, Journal of Richard Henry Dana, 411.

192

Adams, Richard Henry Dana, 181; Lucid, Journal of Richard Henry Dana, 411.

59

the Chief Justice may not have been inclined to question the fugitive’s rendition.193
Judges often use procedural ruling to reach results with which they agree.194 By going
beyond the requirements of the law to rule against Shadrach, Shaw may have denied at
least one fugitive’s claim to freedom for non-legal reasons.
Though obviously a biased party, Dana summed up his encounter with Shaw by
writing:
The conduct of the Chief Justice, his evident disinclination to act, the
frivolous nature of his objections, and his insulting manner to me, have troubled
me more than any other manifestation. It shows how deeply seated, so as to
effect, unconsciously I doubt not, good men like him, is this selfish hunkerism of
the property interest on the slave question.
....
. . . Judge Metcalf was present at my interview with Judge Shaw, and expressed
himself very much disturbed by the conduct of the chief.195
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As a conservative or ‘Cotton’ Whig and strong supporter of Daniel Webster,196
Shaw’s support for the Fugitive Slave Act should come as no surprise. Although
Webster condemned slavery as a moral and political evil, he was above all a champion of
the Union. In his famous Seventh of March speech on the Compromise of 1850, in which
he claimed that his “sole motive” was “the preservation of the Union,”197 Webster
emerged as the preeminent champion of the Fugitive Slave Act in the North. He asserted
that, on the subject of fugitive slaves, “as a question of morals and a question of
conscience, . . . the South is right, and the North is wrong.”198 He thus pledged “to
support, with all its provisions, to the fullest extent” the Fugitive Slave Act.199 Moreover,
Whig support for the Fugitive Slave Act in Boston was not limited to politicians, as
Supreme Court Justice Benjamin R. Curtis, also a Bostonian Cotton Whig and strong
supporter of Webster, publicly defended both the constitutionality and morality of the
Fugitive Slave Act.200
IV.

Conclusion
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The prevailing view of the antislavery judge should be reconsidered. The
conventional wisdom--that the law forced antislavery judges to uphold proslavery
positive law or abandon their judicial role--is analytically incomplete. Although the
traditional view holds true for many lower court trial judges, it fails to fully explain the
motivation behind those antislavery judges who ruled as a matter of first impression. At
least with regard to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the most important and commonly
invoked proslavery law in the North, legal factors did not at first dictate a proslavery
result. Rather than limit these judges’ discretion, the judicial role forced them into an
anguishing dilemma. In their constitutional jurisprudence, antislavery judges were likely
influenced to rule against the plight of fugitive slaves by a fear that ruling against the
fugitive act could result in disunion and sectional conflict.
The conventional account also finds little support in slavery jurisprudence beyond
the fugitive slave issue. Instead of following the proslavery majority in Dred Scott,
Justices McLean and Curtis ruled that Congress could prohibit slavery in the territories
and that blacks could be United States citizens. Additionally, as explained above, Shaw
and McLean rescinded comity with the South on issues involving slaves voluntarily
brought into the Free States by their masters. It is likely no accident that these
antislavery rulings were applauded by most conservative Republicans and were not
widely perceived to threaten sectional stability. In their slavery jurisprudence, prominent
antislavery judges, like moderate Republican politicians, thus were willing to embrace
antislavery arguments that would have contained slavery in the South; however, they fell
short of accepting those that they feared would threaten the Union.
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